We find discrepancies between the General Advertising amounts reclassified by PATH in its Compliance Filings compared to the General Advertising amounts the Commission required PATH to reclassify in Opinion No. 554.

On compliance, PATH must eliminate all General Advertising costs from its recoverable amounts, or else specifically justify each item in light of Opinion No. 554.  In making the compliance filing, PATH must provide the journal entries to reflect the adjustments, and workpapers necessary to explain the accounting corrections for that FERC Form No. 1 input that references back to the journal entries; and the revised/corrected draft Form No. 1 inputs.

Did you make a compliance filing, PATH?

No!  We don't need to!  We made an informational filing!

Are you sure you don't need to make a compliance filing, PATH?

No!  FERC meant an informational filing, not a compliance filing!

Where's our $70M?

PATH must submit a compliance filing with the Commission describing either:  (1) its plan for ending its operations and a timeline for when it intends to file a notice of cancellation of its transmission formula rates, or (2) the type of “transmission or sale of electric energy” that requires its rates to stay in effect.  We direct PATH to submit this compliance filing within 30 days of the date of this order.  To the extent that PATH intends to unwind, PATH must make the appropriate filings under FPA section 205, as necessary, to implement this action.  PATH shall notify the Commission within 10 days of the date that the closing out of business is complete.

The PATH project is an example of a project that faced significant public opposition.

As part of its analysis of the public interest, the PSC acknowledged the substantial opposition to the project expressed by business owners, farmers, and individual landowners across whose properties the project was proposed to cross. The Missouri PSC noted, “In this case, the evidence shows that any actual benefits to the general public from the Project are outweighed by the burdens on affected landowners.”

The National Park Service, for example, required significant and expensive mitigation measures from the developers for the Susquehanna-Roseland project in order to gain its approval for completion of the portion of the line that crossed the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area, which it is mandated to protect.

The development of a transmission project is a commercial venture involving investors who are prepared to incur significant, yet ultimately limited, up-front development costs in return for the opportunity to earn future profits from the sale of transmission services and/or a regulated return on invested capital. Adopting a developer’s perspective enables us to look at the factors reviewed in this report as ones that affect either the cost or time required to construct a transmission project. The extent to which these factors represent barriers to the implementation of transmission projects is thus an assessment of whether these costs or time requirements are avoidable or necessary.

There are documented examples of project developers who have sought to reduce these costs and associated time requirements through up-front information sharing and joint (and early) development of mitigation approaches (including abandonment of early proposed and development of new routing options). The success of these activities has hinged largely on the extent to which they lead to meaningful engagement and tangible commitments to address public concerns over line routing.

The state-centric public-interest issue that arises most vividly for multi-state transmission projects involves the so-called “fly-over” states. These states are situated between the states that are the starting and ending points for a long-distance transmission project. The initial decisions by the Missouri PSC to deny the CPCN application for Grain Belt Express exemplify this issue. The public-interest issue raised by states in the middle is that, at bottom, they are being asked to bear significant portions of the cost or adverse impacts of a project, yet they do not believe they are being provided with sufficient opportunities to share in the benefits of the project.

The need to satisfy a middle state’s public-interest requirements is a classic example of what economists describe as the role and importance of “side payments.” In this instance, the gains from trade must be sufficient to cover side payments to affected parties who have standing but who would not otherwise benefit from the transaction. Thus, the situation faced by developers, such as those for the Grain Belt Express project, is tangibly and fundamentally (but not solely) commercial in nature. Notably, as discussed, the developers for Grain Belt Express recently reached an agreement to sell power from the project to an association of municipal utilities in Missouri and, based on this agreement, plan to re-file their request for state regulatory approval. It remains to be seen whether the fact of a Missouri entity signing an agreement that could be seen as demonstrating the public-interest value of the project in Missouri will result in the Missouri PSC approving the project on its third attempt in the state.

Developing a transmission project involves simultaneously managing two categories of commercial risk. One is the risk associated with securing the capital necessary to build the project. Eto (2016) focused on one example of capital risk: that associated with seeking regional cost allocation. The other category encompasses risks associated with the actual construction of a project. This report is focused on a key subset of these project-construction risks: the cost of satisfying the due process requirements of state and federal agencies involved in permitting and siting lines, which is often increased when there is organized public opposition to the project. These are necessary costs associated with transmission-line construction. Some can made more manageable through proactive actions by developers. Still others can be made more manageable through the actions of federal and state agencies to enhance the efficiency and accountability of their processes. Thus, while the project review process can be slow and add costs to project development, on the whole transmission lines are being built. Moreover, there are promising signs that both groups are taking actions to improve the processes, both in terms of their duration and the quality of the decisions that get made. We found examples of merchant transmission projects successfully gaining needed approvals and being constructed. Their experiences, in particular, suggest that if the economics of potential projects are sound, someone will find a way to build them.

The DPA is not asking PJM to do something it has never done before. PJM has reevaluated
projects in the past. After reconsideration, PJM canceled the Mid-Atlantic Power Pathway ("MAPP") and the Pennsylvania-Allegheny Transmission Highway ("PATH") projects.

While the reasons for cancellation may be different in this case, the fact of the matter is that simply because PJM has approved a project does not mean that it gets done come what may. In cancelling the MAPP and PATH projects, PJM acknowledged that changed circumstances had caused it to reevaluate the projects; unfortunately, however, ratepayers are paying significant abandonment costs. We ask PJM to re-evaluate this Project before LS Power and PSE&G incur costs that will ultimately be recovered from ratepayers of all PJM members.

The DPA asks PJM to remember that end-use customers are ultimately the ones that pay
for projects such as this. Indeed, neither PJM nor its member companies would exist if not for customers. And those customers are not a wallet from which PJM and its member utilities can obtain unlimited funds.

Big Transmission never did and never will make sense. Let’s look at a half-dozen reasons why: 1) the laws of physics, 2) higher reliability risk, 3) stricter contingency limits, 4) lumpiness and investment risk, 5) rigidity of source and sink, and 6) better alternatives.

It is difficult to apportion the demise of PATH among reduced load growth, the Mt. Storm-Doubs alternative, new generation, and sophisticated statelevel opposition. However, it is fair to observe that reduced load growth had only postponed PATH in the past (three times). What was different in 2010 was the emergence of the Mt. Storm-Doubs  alternative, and the focus of a state regulator on that alternative.

But certainly when Big Transmission is dependent upon market conditions the lumpiness and risk factors are all the more daunting. Big Transmission somehow needs to bring together generation resources and market demand – to the exclusion of alternatives – to forge a level of commitment that will last for many years. That’s a prerequisite for financing. So the entities at each end need to perceive such a compelling business proposition that they will forego other alternatives and cast their fate with Big Transmission. That’s a tough sell.

FERC requires that utilities interconnect all new generation. So a new generator is assured of being able to interconnect its project to the utility serving the territory it is located in; the issue is solely how much money and time it will take for the interconnection. Given this legally assured ability to access the grid through the resident utility, market-based Big Transmission is effectively competing with that utility and thus must offer substantial value added.

Opponents used some of those arguments to successfully derail the Potomac-Appalachian Transmission Highline, a 290-mile line from Putnam County, W.Va., to Frederick County, Md., proposed by Allegheny Energy in 2008. The Greensburg company, acquired by FirstEnergy in 2011, suspended the project after it could not convince regulators the line was necessary.

PJM staff reviewed results of analyses showing reliability drivers no longer exist for the project throughout the 15-year planning cycle. The analyses incorporated the continued trends of decreasing customer load growth, increasing participation in demand response programs and the recent commitment of new generating capacity in eastern PJM.

While citizen groups have fought transmission projects — often successfully — by attacking the developer’s need to build them, the environmental regulations could usher in more projects and complicate opposition.

Changing drivers of transmission

Transmission companies see big potential for new projects, particularly from sparsely populated areas that generate wind energy to urban areas. “Just as trains carried cattle and other goods from the rural areas to urban centers, the Plains & Eastern Clean Line will carry renewable energy from the Plains of the Southwest,” states the website of one developer, Clean Line Energy of Houston, Texas.

Clean Line expects federal approval for its 700-mile Plains & Eastern Clean Line, designed to carry 4,000 megawatts of power from wind farms in the panhandle of Oklahoma. The line will terminate near Memphis, Tenn. Clean Line has four other projects in the pipeline.

“We anticipate a very busy 2016,” said company president Michael Skelly. 

...some wind mills and solar farms in areas with constant breeze and abundant sunshine

...the Commission concludes that, as courts have recognized, retail customers may file complaints and protest transmission rates and wholesale sales rates before the Commission.  Moreover, allowing retail customers to challenge such rates does not violate principles of federalism or interfere with states’ rights.

(1)  Shouldn’t section 306 of the Federal Power Act (FPA) be interpreted
in pari materia with section 201 of the FPA?  FPA section 201 gives the Commission jurisdiction over wholesale interstate rates and interstate transmission; therefore, retail ratepayers would not have the right to file complaints against wholesale rates.

(2) Wouldn’t an expansive interpretation of section 306 of the FPA (allowing retail ratepayers or end users to file complaints against interstate wholesale rates) violate the delicate balance of federalism; in other words, by giving complaint authority to retail rate customers, is the Commission interfering with states’ rights by asserting jurisdiction over retail rates?

answer the questions as follows: 
(1) “retail ratepayers are not permitted to bring an FPA section 205 complaint against wholesale sellers of electricity[;]” and (2) a different interpretation (i.e., allowing such retail ratepayer complaints) “would interfere with state jurisdiction over retail rates.”

Complaints may be filed under sections 206 and/or 306 of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824e, 825e (2012).  While section 205(e) of the FPA refers to “complaints,” 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (2012), the Commission commonly refers to these filings as protests.  See 18 C.F.R. § 385.211 (2015).   

The plain language of the FPA and the Commission’s implementing regulations allow broad participation in proceedings before the Commission.  Specifically,
section 306 of the FPA explicitly authorizes “[a]ny person” to file a complaint with
the Commission. The Commission’s regulations are to a similar effect.  For example, Rule 206(a) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedures provides that “[a]ny person may file a complaint seeking Commission action against any other person alleged to be in contravention or violation of any statute, rule, order, or other law administered by the Commission or for any other alleged wrong over which the Commission may have jurisdiction.

Ms. Peine, an intervenor in this proceeding, is contesting the SWEPCO/AEP transmission formula rate inputs, and thus rates for transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce, which is within the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction under Part II of the FPA.  These transmission inputs, i.e., costs, flow through to Ms. Peine’s retail electric bill.  Stated another way, Ms. Peine is an “end-use customer that will pay  . . . some portion of that [transmission] rate when flowed through [her] retail bill.” Thus, by challenging the transmission formula rate inputs, Ms. Peine has alleged injury in fact that can only be addressed by the Commission.  Under these facts, Ms. Peine is permitted to file a protest or a complaint and to participate in this proceeding by intervening.

This outcome is consistent with federalism.  Section 201 of the FPA recognizes the authority of the states over retail sales and facilities used in “local distribution.”  Ms. Peine’s formal challenges, however, go to the transmission formula rate inputs identified in the SWEPCO/AEP 2013 and 2014 Annual Updates.  Ms. Peine’s claims, therefore, go to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and not to local distribution

Moreover, this issue is not a matter of first impression, as both the courts and the Commission have concluded previously that protecting consumers is one of the Commission’s primary responsibilities.

...the relevant definition of “interested parties” under the SWEPCO/AEP Protocols is not the version that was filed in 2007, but rather the version that was in effect when Ms. Peine filed her formal challenges under the Protocols, and that version did not include the examples that the Settlement Judge construed as limiting the definition of interested parties to exclude Ms. Peine.  Moreover, we disagree with the Settlement Judge’s interpretation of the parenthetical phrase in the earlier version of the SWEPCO/AEP Protocols.  The parenthetical phrase “(e.g., Transmission customers and affected state and federal regulatory authorities)” provided examples of categories of interested parties, and should not be read as exhaustive.  This parenthetical language would not preclude an end-use customer, like Ms. Peine, who will pay a portion of the transmission rate in her retail bill, from challenging the inputs to the SWEPCO/AEP transmission formula rate.

Lastly, as to the administrative efficiency concerns raised by the Settlement Judge and AEP, we note that the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure provide appropriate measures to streamline Commission proceedings.

I urge you to make the concepts described in this book a regular point of reference for the manner in which you carry out your work and the treatment of others.